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The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols following
certain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computational
system—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its com-
mands. In opposition to this classical view, defenders of embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the body in
which the cognitive agent is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes. From a representationalist framework
regarding our conscious experience, in this article, I will offer a novel argument in favor of EC and show that cognition
constitutively—and no merely causally—depends upon body activity beyond that in the brain. In particular, I will argue
that in order to solve the problem derived from the empirical evidence in favor of the possibility of shifted spectrum,
representationalist should endorse the view that experiences concern its subject: the content of experience is de se. I
show that this claim perfectly matches the phenomenological observation and helps explaining the subjective character
of the experience. Furthermore, I argue that entertaining this kind of representation constitutively depends on bodily
activity. Consequently, insofar as cognition depends on consciousness, it is embodied.
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1. Introduction
The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds
that cognition is a matter of computation, that is, of
manipulating abstract symbols following certain rules.
According to this view, the body is merely an input/out-
put device, which allows the computational system—
the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the
senses and to act in the environment following its
commands.
In opposition to this classical view, defenders of
embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the
body and the environment in which the cognitive agent
is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes.
There is, however, a good deal of diversity in how such
a relevance is spelled out—see Wilson (2002) for a
review. Very often, EC is confused with situated cogni-
tion, the view that some cognitive processes cannot be
isolated from the environmental conditions in which
they take place. Despite the fact that sometimes the
questions EC deals with are revealingly discussed
together with situated cognition views (Clark, 2008;
Rupert, 2009; Shapiro, 2011), in this article, I do not
wish to discuss the relevance of the environment in cog-
nition, but rather to focus on the pertinence of other
parts of the organism, beyond the brain, in cognitive
processes. In particular, I will argue in favor of a view
in which consciousness constitutively depends on bodily
activity beyond that of the brain—which uncontrover-
sially is involved in consciousness and cognition.
According to this view, insofar as cognition depends on
consciousness, cognition is embodied.
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Many of our mental states are phenomenally con-
scious, that is, they have phenomenal character, or to
borrow Nagel’s expression there is something it is like
to be in them. Examples of conscious states are those
one undergoes while looking at the ocean or at a red
apple, drinking a glass of scotch or a tomato juice,
smelling coffee or the perfume of a lover, and listening
to the radio or a symphonic concert. Further examples
are bodily sensations such as pains, hunger pangs, or
orgasms. Emotions also have a characteristic feeling;
just consider the radiant feeling at being happy or the
languidness of depression. There is also a conscious
states associated with mental imagery; for instance,
when one imagines a paradisiacal beach or remembers
one’s first kiss.
The term cognition is used as an umbrella for differ-
ent mental processes including perception, learning,
remembering, judging, or problem-solving. Many of
these cognitive processes seem to depend on phenomen-
ally conscious states, the clearest case being perception.
Although it is widely accepted that there is unconscious
perception,
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this process typically involves the presence
of conscious states. Likewise, remembering involves
mental imagery and emotions. Problem-solving often
depends on consciousness, not only because it com-
monly involves perception or mental imagery—for
instance, to figure out counterfactual situations—but
also because emotions seem to be involved in the pro-
cess (Damasio, 1995; Duncan & Barrett, 2007). It is
therefore very plausible that if consciousness is embo-
died, so is cognition, at least to the same extent.
Phenomenally conscious states are intentional states:
they represent the world as being a certain way. Still, it
is not always the case that the world is that way, as in
cases of illusions or hallucinations.
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The former obser-
vations make the claim that the intentional content of
experience determines the phenomenal character of
experience very plausible. In other words, if we call phe-
nomenal properties the properties of my mental states
that ground what it is like to undergo those states, phe-
nomenal properties are some kind of representational
properties. This is the thesis of representationalism.
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Although there is a tendency among defenders of
embodied and situated cognition to deflate the role
representations play in the explanation of cognition
and stress other notions like that of autopoiesis (Di
Paolo & Thompson, 2014; Varela, Thompson, &
Rosch, 1991), or sensorimotor dependencies (Noë, 2005;
O’Regan, 2011), is unclear—to say the least—that they
get rid of them (Hutto & Myin, 2013). That said, repre-
sentationalism is an appealing theory for the project of
naturalizing consciousness, assuming that the relation
of representation can be naturalized. Any plausible nat-
uralistic theory of mental content will commit represen-
tationalists to some weak form of situated cognition
and embodiment—see, for instance, Cummins (1975);
Dretske (1988); Millikan (1984); Mossio, Saborido, and
Moreno (2009); Neander (1991); and Papineau (1993).
The relevant question in the debate is whether the role
that the body or the environment play is constitutive
rather than merely causal.
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My aim in this article is to
offer a novel argument in favor of this strong form of
EC. I will argue that the best theory of representation-
alism should embrace the thesis that phenomenal prop-
erties are embodied, independently of the general
problem of explaining the relation of representation.
This will show that even if we assume a representation-
alist starting point, we should end up with the conclu-
sion that embodiment is constitutive of cognition.
In the following section, I will show that one of the
most serious problems for representationalists is how to
make sense of their claims, given the empirical evidence
suggesting that there can be two normal individuals
whose visual experiences are slightly different (their
visual spectra is shifted with regard to each other) where
none of them can be said to misrepresent. The experi-
ences of such shifted individuals can be about the same
property (have the same content) and that, nonetheless,
the subjects undergo experiences with different charac-
ter. This problem can be addressed if the content of
experience concerns not only the environment but also
the subject that is having the experience as such: the
content of experience is de se, in having an experience
one self-ascribes a certain property. In section ‘‘The
phenomenology of subjectivity,’’ I will argue that the
view that the content of experience is constituted by
self-ascribed properties perfectly matches the phenom-
enological observation. In the last section, I will explain
in what sense these kinds of representational properties
depend on embodiment.
2. Representationalism and shifted
spectrum
Color perception in humans depends partially on par-
ticular light sensitive cells in the retina called cones.
There are three kind of cones, each one responding
mainly to light with a wavelength within a certain
range, called accordingly long, medium, and short cones.
They have peak wavelengths of close to 564–580, 534–
545, and 420–440 nm, respectively. Lutze, Cox, Smith,
and Pokorny (1990) have shown that standard devia-
tion in peak sensitivity of the cones of normal subjects
is 1–2 nm. This variation is very important, if we con-
sider the difference in peak sensitivity between long and
medium cones. There are also a number of specific
genetic divisions in the peak sensitivities on humans
depending on sex, race and age (differences over 5 nm!!
Neitz and Neitz (1998)). These differences are not
always compensated by the visual system. Kraft and
Werner (1994) study on the effect of aging on the visual
system concludes that the visual system corrects certain
alterations of the early stages of the visual system, in
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this case, in the retina, but also that these corrections
are insufficient, especially at short wavelengths. These
differences have been confirmed to influence the
appearance of colors. Neitz, Neitz, and Jacobs (1993)
showed that people whose cone’s middle- or long-
wavelength sensitivity differ disagree about the propor-
tion of the mixture of two colors required to obtain a
third color.
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While looking at a red apple, I have a phenomenally
conscious experience as of red. According to represen-
tationalism, the phenomenal character of my experi-
ence is determined by the property of representing red.
The empirical evidence presented above suggests that
the phenomenal character of the visual experiences that
two different subjects have while looking at the same
red apple could be different—even if we assume that
they are looking at the very same apple from the very
same point of view under the same lighting conditions.
If none of them can be said to misrepresent, then repre-
sentationalism seems to be false, because both subjects
have experiences with the same content but nevertheless
differ phenomenologically: one is having, what we can
call a phenomenally red34 experience and the other a
phenomenally red36 experience.
Representationalism can be saved by supposing that,
whereas shifted subjects represent the object as being
the same color—there is a content they both share,
namely, the color of the apple, there is also a represen-
tational difference with respect to another property
that is attributed to the object by the experience
(Shoemaker, 1994). We might call these properties
‘‘appearance properties.’’ The phenomenal character of
experience is fully determined by these appearance
properties.
A satisfactory characterization of such properties is
complicated. Intuitively, they should satisfy the follow-
ing constraints (Egan, 2006):
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Difference. Shifted individuals should represent the
apple as having different appearance properties.
Correctness. Shifted individuals should both represent
the apple correctly.
Novelty. Appearance properties are not colors.
Possible-Sameness. It might be possible that one indi-
vidual correctly attributes the same appearance to the
apple that another individual correctly attributes to
another object of slightly different color.
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Contrariness. Correctly representing something as hav-
ing the appearance property A should be incompatible
with correctly representing it as having the appearance
property B.
Shoemaker (2000) proposes as a candidate for
appearance properties of the form being disposed to
cause phenomenally red34 experiences in some kind of
observer.
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There is an ambiguity in this characteriza-
tion, as Egan argues, and none of the disambiguations
seem to be a satisfactory option. The property which
my experience attributes to the apple could be that of
being disposed to cause phenomenally red34 experiences
in some kind of possible observer or in some kind of
actual observer. The first option is not plausible, for
nearly everything is disposed to cause phenomenally
red34 experiences in some kind of possible observer, and
the same is true of phenomenally red36 experiences. So,
on the very plausible assumption that necessary coex-
tensive properties are the same, shifted individuals
would be attributing the same property to the apple,
and therefore, Difference would not be satisfied.
Shifted individuals would not represent the apple as
having different appearance properties, but they would
differ phenomenologically.
If we consider the second option, we can see that
there are also two possible readings depending on the
force of the term ‘‘actual’’ (Egan, 2006, pp. 505–506).
The relevant property could be that of being disposed to
cause phenomenally red34 experiences in some kind of
observer who exists in the actual world, or it could be the
property of being disposed to cause phenomenally red
experiences in some kind of observer who exists in the
world in which the object exists. The first option cannot
be the characterization we are looking for. It restricts
the kind of observers to the actual world, and therefore,
it cannot account for merely counterfactual shifted
spectra. The second reading faces similar counterintui-
tive consequences. According to this view, an apple of
the very same color as the one I have in front of me
would lack some appearance properties in a world
where, for instance, there were no observers—it would
therefore lack the disposition to cause phenomenally
red34 experiences in any observer in this world.
In order to solve these problems, we can focus on a
certain kind of subjects, which would allow mere possi-
ble objects and kinds of subjects to be taken into con-
sideration, something like having the disposition to cause
phenomenally red34 experiences in subjects of type T. But
this alternative is also problematic because Possible-
Sameness cannot be satisfied: if two shifted subjects
belong to different types, then they cannot attribute the
same appearance property to different objects, as is
intuitively the case. Furthermore, Contrariness is not
satisfied either.
Egan shows that the problem cannot be solved if we
want to hold that we attribute some sort of property to
the primary object of experience—the apple in our
example. However, the problem is solved if we attribute
what he calls ‘‘a centered feature,’’ a subject-dependent
property that can be expressed in English as something
like being disposed to cause certain state in me.
Technically, if properties are functions from possible
worlds to extensions, centered features are function
from a centered world (the dupla\world; individual . )
to extensions as we will see. It is then easy to see that
attributing a centered feature to the primary object is
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equivalent to self-attributing a property (Egan, 2006;
Lewis, 1979). The apple has this feature relative to a
centered world in which I am the marked observer just
in case the object is disposed to cause phenomenally
red34 experiences in me and also has the property rela-
tive to a centered world in which an individual whose
spectrum is shifted with regard to mine, if the apple is
disposed to cause phenomenally red36 experiences in
her. In this case, both subjects might correctly self-
attribute the property of being in different perceptual
relations—we will see this in further detail. This pro-
posal fulfills all the desiderata, as Egan shows.
9
One consequence of this proposal that some readers
might find puzzling is the idea that centered features,
and not properties, enter the content of experience. The
experience concern the very same subject that is having
the experience: the kind of representation that deter-
mines the phenomenology is a first-person or de se rep-
resentation (Castañeda, 1966; Lewis, 1979). Egan
presents this proposal as a price worth paying for sav-
ing representationalism. In the next section, I will argue
that there is no drawback to this view and that a care-
ful phenomenological observation reveals precisely that
the content of experience is de se. In the last section, I
will provide a more detailed characterization of this
kind of representation and explain in what sense this
representationalist view is committed to the embodi-
ment thesis.
3. The phenomenology of subjectivity
Consider again the visual experience you have while
looking at a red apple, the apple and its properties con-
stitute what we can call ‘‘the primary object of percep-
tion.’’ If representationalism is to deal with shifted
spectrum, it better be, as we have just seen, that the
experience concerns not only the primary object of per-
ception but also about the subject of experience. Can
we provide independent support for such a claim?
One might find such support in a priori reasoning.
When Nagel introduced his famous locution, he
emphasizes the fact that in having an experience there
is something it is like for the subject to be in such state.
However, it is not at all clear that the expression ‘‘there
is something it is like for X to u’’ has any import to
describe subjectivity as Byrne (2004) has shown (see
Nida-Ruemelin (2017) for an argument immune to
Byrne’s objection). Similar ideas have been presented in
different terms by different philosophers. Kant, for
instance, argued that in order to account for what I
have called the phenomenological observation, that is,
for mental representations to be mine, we need to
account for a certain sense of self and a certain sense of
self-consciousness:
For the manifold representations, which are given in an
intuition, would not be one and all my representations, if
they did not all belong to one self-consciousness. As my
representations (even if I am not conscious of them as
such) they must conform to the condition under which
alone they can stand together in one universal self-con-
sciousness, because otherwise they would not all without
exception belong to me. (B132, B133, my emphasis)
More recently, Flanagan (1993) has argued that phe-
nomenal consciousness involves some weak sense of
self-consciousness, not only in the sense that there is
something it is like for me to have the experience but
also in my experiencing a quality as mine. Burge (2007)
makes a related point:
[P]henomenal consciousness in itself involves phenomenal
qualities being conscious for, present for, the individual.
They are presented to the individual consciousness. This
presentational relation is fundamental to phenomenal con-
sciousness. I think that this relation can be recognized a
priori, by reflection on what it is to be phenomenally con-
scious. Phenomenal consciousness is consciousness for an
individual. Conscious phenomenal qualities are present for,
and present to, an individual. (p. 405, my emphasis)
Bermudez (1998) has also discussed non-conceptual
forms of self-consciousness that are ‘‘logically and onto-
genetically more primitive than the higher forms of self-
consciousness that are usually the focus of philosophi-
cal debate’’ (p. 274). From the neurological perspective,
the idea that a sense of self is required for experience
has been defended by Damasio (2000, 2010) and Pollen
(2008).
Alternatively, one could also appeal to the transitiv-
ity principle, which Rosenthal suggests that is justified
by our folk psychology. However, appealing to our
folk psychology does not seem to be a satisfactory
option unless we can justify in turn the beliefs that con-
stitute it and, in particular, those that refer to our
experiences (Kriegel, 2009). For this reason, phenomen-
ological observation seems to be the most straightfor-
ward way to motivate the claim that something about
the subject is conveyed by the experience. It has been
claimed that experiences have a distinctive first-
personal character, which, for example, Kriegel (2009)
calls it ‘‘for-meness’’ and Block (2007a)‘‘me-ishness.’’ A
similar insight can be found in the phenomenological
tradition, which contrasts, at least, two forms of self-
consciousness: a reflective and a pre-reflective one. In
reflective self-consciousness, one has access to oneself
in the same sense that one has access to other objects.
In this sense, the self can be very relevant and probably
the most valuable, but it is just another object of expe-
rience, as it might be an apple or a golf course and can
therefore be distinguished from the experiencing sub-
ject, it is a mere Gegenstand. In pre-reflective self-con-
sciousness, however, one is aware of oneself as the
4 Adaptive Behavior
subject of experience. Gallagher and Zahavi (2006)
present this idea as follows:
There is something it is like to taste chocolate, and this is
different from what it is like to remember what it is like to
taste chocolate, or to smell vanilla, to run, to stand still, to
feel envious, nervous, depressed or happy, or to entertain
an abstract belief. Yet, at the same time, as I live through
these differences, there is something experiential that is, in
some sense, the same, namely, their distinct first-personal
character. All the experiences are characterized by a qual-
ity of mineness or for-me-ness, the fact that it is I who am
having these experiences. All the experiences are given (at
least tacitly) as my experiences [. . .] All of this suggests
that first-person experience presents me with an immediate
and non-observational access to myself, and that
consciousness consequently entails a (minimal) form of
self-consciousness. To put it differently, unless a mental
process is pre-reflectively self-conscious there will be noth-
ing it is like to undergo the process, and it therefore cannot
be a phenomenally conscious process.
It seems that the experience conveys that the subject
herself is related to the primary object rather than just
conveying that certain property is instantiated by the
object; just by virtue of having the experience, the sub-
ject is in a position to immediately form a belief about
the relation she bears to the primary object. All these
observations support the claim that our experiences
convey something not only about the primary object of
experience but also about ourselves.
Now, understanding the sense in which the experi-
ence allegedly conveys something about the subject is
crucial to the discussion. When a subject S has a visual
experience, her experience does not conveys that S is in
certain perceptual state—that S is confronted with cer-
tain object—(S is not an object of experience, pace
Brentano), rather it conveys that she herself
(Castañeda, 1966) is confronted with certain kind of
object: the kind of representation that characterizes the
experience is de se (Lewis, 1979; Perry, 1979). So, a the-
ory of consciousness has to explain the fact that no
matter what the primary object of the experience is (say
certain features of the apple in my experience as of red
apple), the experience is also directed to myself, not
as an object but rather as an experiencing subject. In
accordance to the conclusion of the previous section,
the content of my experience is not merely that such-
and-such is the case, but that such-and-such is presented
to myself. In phenomenally conscious experiences, I do
not merely attribute certain properties to the object
causing the experience and I self-attribute the property
of being perceptually related to an object with certain
properties.
The claim that something about oneself is conveyed
by the experience tends to be resisted because of two
reasons. First, some people tend to believe that de se
representation is allegedly too demanding. This would
lead to the undesired consequence that cognitively sim-
ple animal and human babies would be unable to
undergo conscious experiences. The second reason is
related to the ontological commitments of such a the-
ory, in particular, whether we would need to postulate
some kind of suspicious entity like the self. However,
both objections are misguided in the absence of a the-
ory that accounts for what is required from a system to
entertain that kind of representation. In the sequel, I
will dispel these worries by sketching a naturalistic the-
ory of de se representation (Sebastián, 2012). According
to this theory, this form of representation is neither too
demanding nor committed to any mysterious entity.
However, it is committed to a strong sense of embodi-
ment: de se representation constitutively and not merely
causally depends upon body activity beyond that of the
brain.
4. Consciousness, de se representation,
and embodiment
A very popular view regarding mental content, and one
that I will assume here, maintains that the role of men-
tal states is to distinguish between different possibilities
(Stalnaker, 1999). Traditionally, it has been considered
that mental states are correct or adequate depending
on the way the world might be. That is, they divide the
space of possibilities into sets of possible worlds. An
example might be helpful at this point. Consider the
belief that the president of USA is misogynist and
racist. This belief distinguishes two ways the world
might be. It might be the case that the president of
USA is misogynist and racist or that he is not. It also
takes part for one of these sets, thereby determining a
function from possible worlds to truth value or correct-
ness. So, we say that such belief is correct if the actual
world is such that the president of USA is misogynist
and racist and false or incorrect otherwise; we attribute
a property to the president of USA and such attribu-
tion is adequate or correct if the president has such
property and false otherwise. What is required next is a
theory of mental content, that is, a theory that explains
what is required from a system in order to make ‘‘parti-
tions in the space of possibilities’’ or ‘‘attributions of
properties.’’
In the literature, we find several theories of mental
content. These theories typically appeal to the notion
of indication understood as some sort of covariance
between the vehicle of representation and its object.
The underlying idea is that a mental state represents
what causes it in ‘‘normal conditions’’—in order to
accommodate the idea of misrepresentation, as we do
not want a mental state to represent whatever causes it.
Now, ‘‘normal conditions’’ is a normative notion not
acceptable in a naturalistic framework. The most
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popular route to unpack this idea is by means of the
biological function (Millikan, 1984). As a result, a
representational state is one that has the biological
function to indicate that such-and-such is the
case, where such-and-such is the content. The biologi-
cal function is the one that determines, among all
the things the state indicate, which one is represented:
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attributing property P is a matter of being in a
state that has the biological function of indicating
property P.
The problem for this view derives precisely from
mental states that concern the subject itself as such, that
is, of the de se representations. Compare my belief that
M.Á.S. is drinking coffee and the belief that the only
philosopher with a green t-shirt writing an article on
embodiment in La Roma is drinking coffee. It seems
clear that I can have one without having the other, but
it does not seem the case that they demand the same
from the current world and, therefore, we can easily
capture the differences in terms of possible worlds.
Now consider, on the contrary, my belief that I (myself)
am drinking coffee. As I suggested before, it seems that
I can have the latter without having the first if for any
reason I ignored the fact that I am M.Á.S. However,
both seem to demand the same from the world, that is,
that a certain individual is drinking coffee. For this rea-
son, Lewis suggests that de se representations do not
determine partitions in the space of possibility in possi-
ble worlds but in centered worlds; that is, sets of pairs
of possible worlds and individuals (\w, i. ).
If we can think of possible worlds as ways the world
might be, then we can think of the centered worlds as
the way a world is for an individual (Egan, 2006). Thus,
the belief expressed by the sentence ‘‘I wrote about the
plurality of worlds’’ is a belief that Lewis and I can
share. To evaluate its correctness, we do not only need
a world but also an individual. It is correct with respect
to the pair \w@; Lewis . , but false with respect to the
pair \w@;MS . . In this sense, de se representations
determine functions from centered worlds to truth
values.
I have considered that mental states make partitions
in space of possibilities and what they consist of. The
next question that arises is: What it takes to make the
kind of partitions that de se representations make? If in
order to make partitions into possible worlds, what we
need is a theory that explains how we attribute proper-
ties, what is needed in the case of representations of
oneself, is a theory of self-attribution of properties
(Lewis, 1979). When I believe that I wrote ‘‘On the plur-
ality of worlds,’’ I self-attribute the property of having
written the work in question. The belief is false because
I do not have such property. When Lewis has the very
same belief, he also self-attributes the same property.
But he indeed has it, and hence, his belief is correct.
Continuing with the process of unraveling the nature of
this type of representations, we need to understand
what is required from a system in order to self-attribute
a property. Although there are theories that attempt to
explain what it takes to attribute a property, for the rea-
sons we have seen, self-attribution of S is not reducible
to the attribution of properties to S by S. Lewis (1979)
does not have many clues and simply states that ‘‘Self-
ascription of properties is ascription of properties to
oneself under the relation of identity’’ (p. 543). We need
a new theory.
In the case of self-attributions, it is not enough to be
in a state that has the function to indicate that such-
and-such is the case, we rather need a state that has the
function to indicate that such-and-such is the case for
the very same individual that is doing the representa-
tion. But what kind of entities should we consider as
centers of our semantics? What kind of entity is an
individual? In order to answer this question, we should
think of the kind of entities that are susceptible that
have experiences. The most straightforward reply
within a naturalist framework points toward organism.
But, what is an organism? A widely accepted view in
biology holds that living organisms are self-maintaining
systems, systems that favor the conditions for their own
maintenance. In philosophy, the notion of self-
maintaining system has a long history, which dates
back to Aristotle (Godfrey-Smith, 1994; McLaughlin,
2001) and was popularized by cyberneticians in con-
temporary science. More recently, many scientists
started to migrate from the cybernetic approach to the
thermodynamic view, following the work of Ilya
Prigogine on dissipative structures and their role in
thermodynamics. These dissipative structures would be
the minimal expression of self-maintenance. They are
systems in which a huge number of microscopic ele-
ments adopt a global, macroscopic structure in the
presence of a specific flow of energy and matter in far
from thermodynamic equilibrium conditions (Mossio
et al., 2009, p. 822), a macroscopic structure with a very
low entropy.
This technical notions can be easily illustrated by
means of an example. Consider a heap of sand. One
can grab a handful of sand, let the sand fall, and there
will still be a heap of sand: there are multiple ways the
grains of sand might be rearranged such that there con-
tinue being a heap of sand. Compare it with a sandcas-
tle; there are less ways the grains might be rearranged
so that the castle remains. Entropy measures this fact:
How many ways the constituents can be organized at
the micro level—the grains of sand—consistent with
having the same structure at the macro level—the heap
or the castle; or put more formally, entropy is a loga-
rithmic measure of the number of states with significant
probability of being occupied. The heap of sand is
therefore an organization with a higher entropy than
the castle. Now, the second law of thermodynamics,
which states that the entropy of a system should
increase or otherwise remain constant, can be
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intuitively understood by considering the tendency of a
sandcastle to end up as a heap.
Organisms are systems with low entropy (systems that
work far from thermodynamic equilibrium); they admit
certain internal variations, but such variations have to be
kept within very restricted boundaries. They are entities
that change continuously, remaining, nonetheless, as
functional unities, as unique systems, during the life of
the organism. Organisms have the capacity to keep a sta-
ble internal condition compensating external and internal
changes through exchange of matter and energy with the
exterior—this is known as ‘‘homeostatics.’’ The idea that
I will develop in what follows is that, if this is what organ-
isms are, then it seems reasonable to ground a theory of
self-attribution in those invariants and in the mechanisms
responsible for such stability.
Damasio (2000, 2010) makes an interesting proposal
in this direction presenting his notion of proto-self. The
proto-self is an integrated collection of neural patterns
distributed over the brain that represent the most stable
aspects of the physical structure of the organism and
are involved in the process of regulating the organism’s
state.
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According to Damasio, the proto-self is a struc-
ture that does not just regulate the homeostatic pro-
cesses of the organism, monitoring the extra-cellular
environment (the internal milieu) but also, for example,
the musculoskeletal structure and the visceral muscula-
ture. Damasio argues that these neural patterns are
constitutive of the neural mechanisms underlying our
conscious experience, and I will make use of it in my
elaboration of the conditions under which experiences
come to have the required de se content. The idea is to
explain how an organism comes to self-attribute a prop-
erty by means of the interaction of the proto-self with
what I will call ‘‘proto-qualitative states.’’ So, conscious
states are accordingly constituted by the following two
structures—plus the neural structures needed for the
required interaction:
1. The proto-self: a brain structure that has the func-
tion of monitoring the organism invariants and reg-
ulating the homeostasis of the organism. It regulates
the internal environment and tends to maintain a
stable, constant condition required by the self-
maintaining system; the stability required for life.
2. Proto-qualitative state: a brain structure that has the
function of indicating that such-and-such a state of
affairs obtains in the world—for example, the func-
tion of indicating that there is a red object.
We have different kinds of experiences, like the one
we have when looking at an apple and the one we have
when looking at the open sea. These different states are
constituted by different proto-qualitative states. Proto-
qualitative states are not phenomenally conscious, they
don’t have the required (de se) content and neither is
the proto-self. It is the interaction between both of
them that gives rise to a phenomenally conscious men-
tal state because such a complex will have the function
of indicating that the very same organism that the
proto-self regulates is being affected by the object the
proto-qualitative state represents. Here is an example:
When I look at a my computer, I undergo a phe-
nomenally conscious experience. My visual system will
generate a representation of the properties of the com-
puter; this is a proto-qualitative state (PQ). But, as I
just mentioned, this is still an unconscious representa-
tion. Moreover, the organism has a subsystem, the
proto-self, that monitors and controls the homeody-
namics of the organism and other invariants. The
proto-self monitors the status of certain internal states
like the extra-cellular fluid environment, the musculos-
keletal structure, and the visceral musculature. Now,
this latter state is altered by the processing of the com-
puter: there will be changes in the retina or in the mus-
cles that control the position of the eyeball, but also
changes in the smooth musculature of the viscera, at
various places of the body, corresponding to emotional
responses, some of them innate. This interaction will
explain why the content of the complex state consti-
tuted by the proto-self and the proto-qualitative state
concerns the subject in the required sense: it is a de se
representation. According to the theories we are con-
sidering, the content of a state depends upon what the
state has the biological function of indicating (of track-
ing information about). The function of the complex
that the proto-self and the proto-qualitative state(s)
comprise is neither to indicate an object with, say,
such-and-such surface reflectance nor to indicate, for
example, that such-and-such a bodily state obtains, but
rather to indicate that the very same system that is
doing the representing—given that the proto-self,
which is responsible for keeping the organism as what
it essentially is, is part of the complex—is in a certain
perceptual state. When an organism O is in this com-
plex state, it neither merely attributes a property to
another object nor merely attributes a property to O, it
rather self-attributes a property—that of being in a cer-
tain perceptual state. O attributes a property to itself, to
the very same organism that the proto-self regulates,
‘‘under the relation of identity’’ (Lewis, 1979, p. 543):
the system attributes the property to the very same sys-
tem that is doing the representing without any need of
an identification. This complex state represents that the
organism itself* (Castañeda, 1966) is presented with an
object that PQ represents.
We can then look for the neural structures that
would implement this complex. The proto-self would
correspond to several brain stem nuclei including the
tegmentum, the hypothalamus, the insular cortex, and
S2 (Damasio, 2000, 2010); the proto-qualitative states
would be implemented in different areas of the neo-
cortex depending on the modality, like the visual cortex
in the case of a visual experience. Finally, we should be
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after the structures that make the interaction between
the proto-self and the proto-qualitative state possible.
These areas should have ramifications leading to the
areas corresponding to the proto-self as well as the
proto-qualitative state and there being some evidence
that suggest that they play a role in giving rise to con-
scious experiences. Example of these areas are superior
colliculi, the anterior cingulate,
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the thalamus, and the
medial parietal cortex (See Damasio (2000, 2010) and
Laureys and Tononi (2008) for empirical evidence sug-
gesting that these areas are constitutive of the neural
correlate of our conscious experience).
4.1. Self-Involving Representationalism and the
shifted spectrum
In this section, I will try to get clear about the way the
presented view handles cases of shifted spectrum. This
will further help to clarify the theory.
Consider a red apple, which, in normal lighting con-
ditions, reflects light with a wavelength of, say,
650 nm—the apple does not reflect light with a unique
wavelength, but we can abstract from this problem.
Marta’s visual system and mine are slightly different
and we undergo slightly different experiences when we
look at the very same apple under the very same light-
ing conditions. Both experiences are correct. When
Marta and I undergo these experiences, we are in dif-
ferent proto-qualitative states, PQ2 and PQ1, respec-
tively. PQ1, a state of my organism, has the function of
indicating what is disposed to cause it in normal condi-
tions. In these cases, we can assume that such normal
conditions would be something like ‘‘via the particular
visual pathPQ1 under particular lighting conditionsPQ1.’’
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An object has the property that PQ1 represents only if
the object is disposed to cause the activation of PQ1 in
an organism like mine via the particular visual pathPQ1
under particular lighting conditionsPQ1. If an object
reflects light with a wavelength of 650 nm in these
lighting conditions, then it can cause PQ1 via the
particular visual pathPQ1. The surface of the apple
reflects light, in these lighting conditions, with a wave-
length of 650 nm and is therefore represented by PQ1.
In the case of Marta, an object has the property that
PQ2 represents only if the object is disposed to cause the
activation of PQ2 in an organism like Marta’s via the
particular visual pathPQ2 under particular lighting
conditionsPQ2.
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If an object reflects light with a wave-
length of 650 nm, in these lighting conditions, then it can
cause PQ2 via the particular visual pathPQ2. The surface
of the apple does so and is therefore represented by PQ2.
PQ1 interacts with my proto-self, the system that
monitors and controls the homeodynamics of my
organism. The state that results from this interaction is
a phenomenally conscious mental state. This state repre-
sents that the organism is presented with an object that
is disposed to cause PQ1 in normal conditions (via
particular visual pathPQ1 under particular lighting con-
ditionsPQ1). When the organism is in this state, it attri-
butes to itself the property of being presented with an
object that is disposed to cause PQ1 in normal conditions:
it attributes to the object a centered feature.
Marta, however, attributes to herself the property of
being presented with an object that is disposed to cause
PQ2 in normal conditions. Marta correctly attributes to
the apple a different appearance property. Marta’s
experience and mine differ in character because we are
self-attributing different properties, that is to say, we
are attributing to the apple different centered features.
Both experiences are, nevertheless, correct.
Imagine that Marta can be in a proto-qualitative
state PQ1 whose function is to indicate what produces
it via the particular visual pathPQ1 under particular
lighting conditionsPQ1. In the case of Marta, an object is
disposed to cause PQ1 via particular visual pathPQ1 if
the object can reflect light under particular lighting
conditionsPQ1 with a wavelength of 654 nm. The fire
engine on the corner of her street can reflect light with
a wavelength of 654 nm under particular lighting
conditionsPQ1 and therefore is represented by PQ1 in
Marta’s organism. Imagine further that this state inter-
acts with her proto-self. The corresponding phenomen-
ally conscious state represents than the organism is
presented with an object that is disposed to cause PQ1
in normal conditions. When she looks at the fire engine,
she undergoes a phenomenally conscious experience
with the very same character as the one I undergo when
I look at the red apple. I attribute the same centered
feature to the apple that Marta attributes to the fire
engine; we are both attributing to ourselves the same
property. Both attributions are, again, correct.
4.2. Objections and rejoinders
One possible objection to the proposal I have made is
that the role of the proto-self structures in conscious-
ness can be seen as causal and not constitutive.
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This
would weak the claim that phenomenology is embo-
died, because it would not be constitutively so. One
way of presenting this objection is by asking whether
someone whose blood chemicals were regulated by an
external computer that did not interact with her mental
representations would be phenomenally conscious.
It is important to note that the notion of function
required for representation must be such that a trait
has a function even if it fails to perform such a function
(a case of misrepresentation) and even if it never does
so. Consider the kidney of a patient suffering from a
renal failure condition. We say that her kidney is mal-
functioning, it is not performing its function—filtering
blood—even if it has never done so. Similarly, the
proto-self still has the function of indicating and regu-
lating the homeodynamics of the organism. In the
8 Adaptive Behavior
example of the objection, the homeodynamics of the
subject is regulated by an external device and not by
the proto-self. The proto-self is malfunctioning; how-
ever, the phenomenal character of the experience
depends on the function of the proto-self, not on its
actually performing such a function. According to the
model, insofar as the interaction between the required
brain structures—with the corresponding function—
and the body is maintained, the organism can have
conscious experiences.
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One might also worry about the relation between the
proto-self and the proto-qualitative state. What hap-
pens if the modification of the proto-self happens spon-
taneously? What happens if a subject instantiates a
proto-qualitative state that is not accompanied by the
corresponding modification of the proto-self? The reply
to these questions cannot be based on the idea that
there cannot be a proto-qualitative state without a
modification of the proto-self or the other way around.
Surely, the modification of the proto-self corresponding
to my visual experience as of a red patch is accompa-
nied by the corresponding proto-qualitative state and,
in normal circumstances, a proto-qualitative state is
accompanied by a certain modification of the proto-
self. But both can happen independently of each other.
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The answer to the former questions is that, in both
circumstances, we do not have a conscious mental state.
A conscious mental state is a complex constituted by
the proto-self and the proto-qualitative state. Both are
required to have a phenomenally conscious mental
state, a mental state with the proper content; a state
with the proper causal role. If one of their parts or the
relation between them is missing, we have no complex.
Both parts are required to fulfill a certain causal role,
the role that allows the traits to have the function of
indicating a certain centered feature.
Finally, I would like to stress that the proto-self and
the proto-qualitative states are theoretical postulations.
Damasio’s version of the proto-self is a very plausible
candidate for playing the proto-self role required by
the theory. It is a matter of future empirical research to
look for the structures with the causal role postulated
by the theory. If such structures are not found in the
brain, the proposed view would be false.
5. Conclusion
Defenders of situated and EC stress the relevance of the
environment and the body in the explanation of cogni-
tion. Although some of them either deflate the role that
representations play in such explanation or attempt to
get rid of them, representationalism—the view that
maintains that the phenomenal character of the experi-
ence is wholly determined by its representational
content—is not incompatible with those views. In this
article, I have argued that even if we assume a strong
representationalist starting point, we should end up
with the conclusion that our cognition constitutively
depends upon body activity beyond that in the brain.
Representationalism is one of the most appealing
theories in quest of naturalizing consciousness.
However, there is strong empirical evidence in favor of
the possibility of shifted spectrum without misrepresen-
tation. Shoemaker has shown that the introduction of
appearance properties reconciles the representationalist
view with evidence, and Egan has shown that we
should think of appearance properties as centered fea-
tures or self-ascribed properties: the content of the
experience is de se.
I have argued that the claim that the content of the
experience is de se perfectly matches the phenomenologi-
cal observation and helps explaining the subjective char-
acter of the experience. Furthermore, I have maintained
that entertaining this kind of content constitutively
depends on bodily activity (the activity that the proto-
self monitors and regulates). If this is right, the conse-
quence that cognition is embodied immediately follows,
at least insofar as cognition depends on consciousness.
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Notes
1. For a summary on non-conscious perception, see
Merikle and Daneman (1999). For discussion, see Block
(2016), Peters et al. (2016), and Phillips (2016).
2. If hallucinations that are phenomenally indistinguishable
from veridical perceptions are possible, certain radical
theories of situated cognition are seriously jeopardized.
Consider, for instance, Noë (2005), who maintains that
perception does not depend on internal representation,
but is rather constituted by the interaction between the
mind and the world. In the case of a hallucination of a
red apple, however, there is no red apple the mind is
interacting with.
3. There are very diverse characterizations of such repre-
sentational properties. Tye (1997, 2002), for instance,
maintains that they are abstract, non-conceptual repre-
sentations available for belief forming and rational con-
trol; Higher-Order Representational (HOR) theories
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(Carruthers, 2000; Lycan, 1996; Rosenthal, 2005) main-
tain that they have to be the target of a further represen-
tation to become conscious. Prinz (2012) holds that they
are attended intermediate representations; Kriegel
(2009) claims that they are representations that represent
themselves.
4. The term ‘‘constitution’’ is used broadly to refer to rela-
tions such as realization, identity, and constituency. The
aim is solely to distinguish these relations from a merely
causal one. For further detail and taxonomy of relational
claims, one might hold in relation to situated and embo-
died cognition see Prinz (2009).
5. For a detailed presentation of these and other empirical
evidence for shifted spectrum and an argument against
representationalism, see Block (2003, 2007b). For an
attempt to deflate the relevance of these cases, see Allen
(2017).
6. Egan considers the case of inverted spectrum. Many phi-
losophers reject the metaphysical possibility of such sce-
narios. His analysis, however, can be applied mutatis
mutandis to the case of shifted spectrum, as we are about
to see.
7. This principle roughly corresponds to what Egan calls
Sameness. Egan (2006) considers two inverted subjects,
Ernie and Vert, and presents his Sameness desiderata as
follows
Sameness: the appearance property that Ernie’s visual
experience attributes to Kermit is the same as the
appearance property that Vert’s visual experience attri-
butes to, for example, cooked lobsters and ripe tomatoes
(p. 501).
My Possible-Sameness is weaker than Egan’s. Possible-
Sameness simply demands that the characterization of
appearance properties makes room for the possibility of
two shifted individuals correctly attributing the same
appearance property to relevantly different objects. It
should be noted, as Egan does, that Possible-Sameness
and Difference do not impose contradictory demands
on appearance properties. Difference requires that the
appearance property that an individual attributes to the
apple be different from the one Sb attributes to it. Pos-
Sameness requires that the appearance property that the
visual experience of Sa attributes to an object O1 can be
the same as the one that the experience of Sb attributes
to an object of a different color.
8. Shoemaker also suggests a non-dispositional version of
the form properties of the form currently producing a
phenomenally red experience in some observer. He rejects
such a proposal because, in this case, appearance prop-
erties would not be properties that objects would have
when not being observed.
9. Egan leaves one additional problem unresolved. We do
not want to maintain that every object that is disposed
to cause the same experience in me that the apple is dis-
posed to cause shares with it its appearance properties.
Certain kind of drugs might be disposed to cause experi-
ences as of a red apple in me, but I do not thereby attri-
bute any appearance property to the drugs. The object
has to cause the experience in normal circumstances. This
is a normative notion that, if we are interested in
naturalistic theories, has to be unpacked by appealing to
the same theory that explains the relation of representa-
tion. Consider the example of teleological theories of
mental content (Millikan, 1984, 1989; Neander, 1991;
Papineau, 1993). Very roughly, these theories maintain
that a mental state M represents C if and only if M indi-
cates C in normal conditions, where the notion of indica-
tion can be spelled out as a causally grounded tracking
of information, and the normal conditions are deter-
mined by the function of M. In other words, M repre-
sents C because M has the function of indicating C and
not other properties with which it causally correlates. In
our example, the phenomenally conscious state would
have the function of indicating red apples and not drugs,
despite of indicating both of them. As I said above, it is
very plausible that the characterization of the function
of a trait commits us to embodied and/or situated views.
10. This is just a toy example for illustrative purposes. For
further details and discussion, see, for example, Dretske
(1981), Millikan (1984, 1989), Mossio et al. (2009),
Neander (1991), and Schroeder (2004).
11. I have preferred to respect the name given by Damasio
to this structure, but one should not be confused by it.
There is nothing ‘‘self-ish’’ in the proto-self, and it is just
a neural structure with the above-mentioned function.
12. In his most recent work, Damasio (2010) includes the
cingulate cortex as part of the proto-self, and I do not
think that this area is required. Damasio postulates this
area because bilateral anterior lesion of the cingulate
causes a condition known as akinetic mutism, that is
described by Damasio (2000) as ‘‘suspended animation,
internally as well as externally’’ (p. 176). However, aki-
netic mutism is usually characterized as a variant of
minimally conscious states as suggested by the following
observation by Laureys and Tononi (2008):
The interpretation is complicated by the fact that, in the
rare instance in which such patients recover, there is usu-
ally amnesia for the akinetic episode, as in the original
case of Cairns, though one patient who eventually recov-
ered reported that she remembered the questions posed
by the doctor but did not see a reason to respond. (p.
385)
13. PQ1 doesn’t have the function of indicating Transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) or any drug, even if both
are disposed to cause its activation. For that reason,
something like ‘‘via the particular visual pathPQ1 is
included.’’ In the case of vision, the normal conditions
would also include particular lightning conditions.
These normal conditions have to be fixed by the func-
tion PQ1 if a teleological theory of mental content is
true, as we saw in Note 9.
14. Note that the content of proto-qualitative states is not
de se. There is nothing problematic here, because proto-
qualitative states do not have to satisfy all the desiderata
presented in section ‘‘Representationalism and shifted
spectrum.’’
15. I am grateful to Ned Block for raising this objection.
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16. It is worth stressing that the model of de se presentation
presented here, upon which consciousness as I have
argued depends, relies on the existence of a self-
maintained system.
17. The kind of possibility involved here is simply a meta-
physical possibility, not even nomological possibility is
required, although I see no reason to deny the latter.
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Sebastián, M. Á. (2012). Experiential awareness: Do you pre-
fer ‘‘it’’ to ‘‘me’’? Philosophical Topics, 40, 155–177.
Shapiro, L. (2011). Embodied Cognition. New York, NY:
Routledge.
Shoemaker, S. (1994). Phenomenal character. Noûs, 28(1),
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